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THE NATURE OF AN ALLERGIC RESPONSE
To understand the nature of an allergic response is to recognize
human fallibility, the basic human idiosyncrasy or peculiar suscep-
tibility of a particular person using a given consumer product-which
product is wholly innocuous to the vast majority of normal users.
Indeed, it has been often said that there is no product under the sun to
which some person, at some time, is not sensitive, whether that
product be a common food such as strawberries, eggs, milk, or fruits;
a common drug such as aspirin, penicillin or quinine; ordinary cos-
metics, whether applied to the face, hands or hair; or even such
common everyday occurrences as household dust, feathers, heat, cold,
sunlight or what have you. The best true story concerns the young
soldier who wears civilian clothes at all times and exhibits a special
authorization from his commanding officer-because he is sensitive to
the wearing of an army uniform!
The term "allergy" is derived from two Greek words, "allos"
or altered, and "ergia" meaning reactivity. Hence, allergy is an
altered reactivity of an organism, the environmental modification
of a basic change of an organism unable to defend itself against an
antigen. If the particular antigen meets the antibody, and if the
defense mechanism of the body is incapable of doing its normal job,
the body equilibrium is upset, the antigen prevails, and there is an
allergic response. In simple terms, the foreign protein which entered
the body, did not normally combine with the antibodies or receptors
(which the blood cells produce), and neutralize the action of the
protein. Therefore, allergy is a deviation from normal adoptive
processes.
Allergy may be caused by an infection' or by a psycho-trau-
matic experience, either or both of which, in turn, may be produced
by an allergic response. This interrelationship may be described in
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terms of the "eternal triangle" in the field of allergy, for it explains
the interaction between allergy, infection, and the psyche-each may
cause the other, and, in turn, be caused by each other. Thus, allergy
may be acquired because of worry and emotional stress, possible
diet deficiencies, malfunctioning or readjustment of endocrine glands,
abnormal systematic conditions of the skin or liver, or by such ex-
ternal factors as high temperature, humidity, and the like, in com-
bination with these causes. In addition, heredity plays a prominent
role in the development of allergic responses.'
All known allergies are said to gain access to the body by being:
swallowed, such as foods; inhaled, such as air or dust; injected, such
as drugs or serum; or by contact with the skin, such as cosmetics.
The most common allergy in the United States results from inhalation,
i.e., hay fever and asthma, while food allergies run a close second.4
The allergic response or sensitivity can be better understood
by a recognition of three of its better known phenomena. Since allergy
is an altered capacity of an organism to react, it presupposes a previ-
ous sensitization, a prior exposure to an offending substance or sub-
stances. Cross-sensitization is the appropriate medical terminology
whereby a person reacts today to a substance chemically related to
another substance to which he had been previously sensitized. Proof
of prior contact' with that chemically related substance is therefore
3 The United States Public Health Service (Publication No. 168) in 1959 pointed
out, for example, that heredity plays a decisive part in the development of allergic
diseases: "Many people with allergies have come from families where the parents or
other close relatives have had some form of allergic manifestation. Although people
do not inherit a specific disease such as hayfever, they do inherit the tendency to
become sensitive to certain things. Members of the same family who have inherited
such a tendency, may develop altogether different allergic diseases, or they may go
through life without a symptom."
4 Ibid.
5 The process has been likened to the process of immunization to an infectious
disease: Horowitz, "Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based upon Breach
of Implied Warranty of Quality," 24 So. Calif. L. Rev. 221, 224 (1951): "The theory
of immunization, e.g., to typhoid, is to introduce a small quantity of the disease
agent into the human body; antibodies are formed by the body to combat the in-
fectious disease, and these antibodies remain in the bloodstream or elsewhere to fight
off any future invasions by the same disease agent. The allergic diseases are similar
in process, in that the body becomes sensitized by introduction into the body of some
foreign agent-not necessarily toxic in nature-perhaps a synthetic chemical in a
fingernail preparation, or a chemical in a dye, or a protein in a good, or the like-the
sensitization coming about by the formation of antibodies, by the body to cope with
the presence of the foreign agent. Once the body has become sensitized to a particular
foreign substance, upon exposure again to the same foreign substance a violent re-
action occurs--between the foreign substance itself, called an antigen, and the antibodies
which were formed upon first exposure to that antigen. The results of the antigen-anti-
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a requisite in the defense of the products liability claim. However,
too frequently the villian who took the "first bite" goes "scot-free,"
and culpability is mistakingly placed upon the innocuous product
nearest in time to the "second bite" which immediately preceded
the allergic response.6 Sensitivity or sensitization is generally a
transient, temporary experience. A given person may be sensitive
to a given substance today, but not necessarily next week or next
month. A person may react favorably or unfavorably to the product
at a given time, depending upon such factors as systemic, physio-
logical changes, emotional stability, including aging, or simply an
exposure to infection. The use of several substances together or in
combination can create an allergic susceptibility, whereas each sub-
stance separately does not. Furthermore, sensitivity to one substance
can increase the allergic response to a number of other, hitherto
innocuous, substances.
7
It must, of course, be understood that sensitivity is not always
the competent producing cause of dermatitis, for mistreatment and
misuse of a product, contrary to the directions for use of the product,
cannot be overlooked." Also, an allergic response must be differenti-
ated from the reaction of a primary irritant, which is largely unrelated
to individual tolerance and which is expected to occur in a high
percentage of normal persons exposed to the given irritant under the
same conditions for the same period of time.' There can be no question
body biochemical reaction-hay fever, asthma, skin diseases-are the symptoms that
make up one or another of the various allergic diseases."
6 Note, that Ohio has a two-year statute of limitations for bodily injury which
begins to run either at the time the injury was inflicted, or at the time the injured
party could bring the action. See Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th
Cir. 1960).
7 Although defendant has a right to have a physical examination of plaintiff
made by a competent doctor of defendant's own choice (Easterday v. Melhuish,
167 N.E.2d 789 (1959)), the physical examination months after the onset of the allergic
response will seldom show anything medically or legally significant.
8 See 163 journal of the A.M.A. 740 (1957), wherein Dr. Carl T. Nelson of
Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons declares: "Allergic skin con-
ditions are common and plague people the world over. They constitute a large part
of the skin complaints for which the patients seek advice from doctors. But keep in
mind that your skin blemish may just as likely not be on an allergic basis. There is
no good ground for believing that acne (pimples) is caused by allergy. The mystery
of psoriasis (skin disease consisting of an eruption of circumscribed rounded patches
of a red color covered with adherent white scales, occurring chiefly on the extensor
surfaces of the elbows and knees, the scalp, and the back) has not been unravelled,
but it is unlikely that allergy is the explanation. Numerous cases of dermatitis are
due not to allergy but to mistreatment of the skin with alkalies, adds, other chemicals,
mineral oils, rough materials, etc."
9 In Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116 (1962), a
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of the liability of the manufacturer knowingly selling a product
containing a known primary irritant which injures the consumer.
UNFORESEEABILITY OF THE ALLERGIC RESPONSE
Since it is obvious that no person (much less the product
manufacturer, the distributor, or the rethiler) can foretell whether
or not a given purchaser will react allergically to a given product, it
is axiomatic that the allergic response is an unpredictable occurrence,
over which neither the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer have any
control. Indeed, the allergic response is legally non-foreseeable. It is
the "exception to the general rule,"' ° according to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 1960. In Kinkead v. Lysol, Inc." the New
York Appellate Division ruled that the manufacturer, as a matter of
law, did not have to anticipate an injury produced solely because of
allergy. The court properly pegged the defect in the unusual plaintiff
rather than in the product.
The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1959
also pointed up the unpredictability of the allergic reaction:
There is much to be learned about the reason a person suddenly be-
comes allergic to something which has previously been harmless to
him. It has been noted that at times an allergy to a certain food
has made its first appearance following an occasion when the food
has been eaten in excess. Too, it is known that worry and other forms
of emotional stress have caused allergies to flare up. In some cases,
the appearance of an allergic illness is due to disturbances inside the
body rather than to outside irritants such as pollens. The sensitivity
may be associated with bacterial infection, especially of the sinuses,
nose, or throat.12
But there are predictive techniques and procedures 13 which
medical scientists have developed to ascertain whether or not a
given person may be sensitive to a given product. The prophetic
patch or skin test, the repetitive patch technique, and the repeated
insult technique of Draize and Shelanski are but examples of tests
on human beings. Preceding these human predictive testing pro-
cedures may be the Landsteiner-Jacobs guinea pig tests to evaluate
permanent wave lotion allegedly caused "a chemical bum" which plaintiff's physician
characterized as "a chemical trauma." The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed that the
evidence was "reasonably sufficient for the jury to have found plaintiff to be free
from any allergy."
10 Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960).
11 250 App. Div. 832, 296 N.Y. Supp. 461 (1937).
12 Supra note 3.
13 See generally Rostenberg, "Predictive Procedures for Eczematous Hyper-
sensitivity," 20 AMA Arch. Indust. H. 181 (1959).
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chemicals of unknown sensitizing capacity. However, even these
scientific advancements cannot foresee or predict a given allergic
response in a given person to a given product at a given time.
Is THERE AN IDENTIFIABLE "CLASS" OF ALLERGIC USERS?
Since the allergic response is unpredictable as to a given person,
recognition of that allergic consumer as a member of a "class"
entitled to special legal protection is precluded. Furthermore, a sub-
stance or a product which is an allergen must affect a substantial
portion of the population-that portion whose total of resistance factors
is such that they will exhibit sensitivity to the given substance or
product. Thus, the allergic user of a product which is wholly in-
nocuous to the normal user is not entitled to privileged treatment:
even breach of warranty demands only reasonable merchantability
and reasonable fitness for particular purpose. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the Casagrande case expressly declared
that the implied warranty of merchantability of goods is simply
that they are:
... reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses for which goods of
that description are sold when used in accordance with adequate
warning and instructions .... Fitness for use by a normal person
is a test often stated .... The general knowledge of allergies, how-
ever, of which we take notice, and which is reflected in the testi-
mony, makes it unreasonable to infer from any part or parts of
the evidence that a significant number of other persons would have
been hurt by the deodorant. An inference of fact that the product
would have hurt "normal" persons may not be drawn from the
evidence of an allergic reaction in one person who has not previously
shown sensitivity.14 (Emphasis added.)
A federal court in Massachusetts similarly found that the allergic
consumer of a household disinfectant did not belong to any group of
"1some" size to be protected. The product manufacturer could be
found to be negligent only for harm caused a normal person, there
being no direct evidence that the product was "harmful" to anyone
except the plaintiff. 5 The Utah Supreme Court has summarized:
14 Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 10, at 555-556, 165 N.E.2d
at 111-112.
1r Cumbert v. Household Research Corp., 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1956).
In Payne v. R. H. White Co., 314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943), the highest
Massachusetts court pointed out that plaintiff must show that the dress (which allegedly
caused an allergic response) was unfit to be worn by a normal person, and that she
may not recover by merely showing that it was unfit for her or for some unusually
susceptible person to wear. It is to be noted that the court held that, in the absence
of evidence that plaintiff was or was not a person whose skin was only normally
sensitive to infection or irritation, the jury could find her normal in this respect.
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We therefore have the question as to whether a manufacturer who
places the product on the market, knowing that some unknown few,
not in an identifiable class which could be effectively warned, may
suffer allergic reactions or otherwise stated injuries not common to
the ordinary or normal person, must respond in damages. Although
there is authority to the contrary, we think that the prevailing and
better rule is that the injury is caused by the allergy or unusual
susceptibility of the person and not by the product.""
The language of Section 601(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act defines an adulterated cosmetic product as one con-
taining "any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render
it injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in the label-
ing thereof, or under such conditions of use as are customary or usual."
(Emphasis added.) Indeed, an allergen is NOT a "poisonous or delete-
rious substance17"; nor is an allergic response a condition of use as is
16 Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951). Here plain-
tiff, a beautician, in the course of her work in the beauty salon, applied defendant's
permanent wave lotion (containing ammonium thioglycolate) to patron's hair, along
with a powder fixative (containing potassium bromate.) According to defendant manu-
facturer's instruction, the two products were to be applied with bare hands, and the
whole hair-waving process was controlled by an electric dryer. After seven or eight
weeks' use of the lotion, plaintiff's hands became blistered and "inflammation appeared
between her fingers" which soon spread to her arms and shoulders. Her physician
diagnosed the condition as an allergic contact dermatitis, not due to the lotion or fixative
separately, but to the mixture of both, which fact patch tests subsequently confirmed.
Plaintiff was compelled to terminate her occupation as a beautician. In her action
against the manufacturer she alleged both breach of warranty and negligence in dis-
tribution of the product without warning, but the warranty count was abandoned
at pre-trial. The Utah Supreme Court in affirming the non-suit, found no evidence
which would render reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer the peculiar sensitivity
or idiosyncrasy of plaintiff.
17 In Cleary v. John M. Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
a certain metallic nipple shield purchased by the mother allegedly caused metallic
poisoning of the infant through possible ingestion. Since thousands of such shields
had been used for years without harm, and the manufacturer and retailer had no knowl-
edge that the shields were dangerous, the New York court, in dismissing the complaint
on its merits, said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that many persons are allergic to conditions
which do not affect the normal individual. Cases so holding are legion with refer-
ence to wearing apparel, cathartics, face powders and sedatives. In this state it
has been held that "preparation is not deleterious to human health, in the ordi-
nary acceptation of that term, simply because one person in a multitude of those
using it happens to meet with ill effects from taking it." . .. How from the evi-
dence before this court can it be determined whether or not this infant was the
subject of a peculiar hypersensitivity to the almost insignificant lead deposits (if
there were any) upon the mother's breasts? It is the plaintiff upon whom rests
the burden of proving this case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Prior to
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"customary or usual.""8 Drug products under Section 502 (f) of the
Act are required to be labeled so as to appropriately warn against
known dangers in method of use or quantity of dosage. Surely no one
would contend that every manufacturer must warn about a potential
allergic response in that particular, susceptible individual, simply
because, as Dr. Harry Swartz expressed it, "Everybody is a candidate
for allergy and 50% of the population actually suffer from allergy
in one form or another today." 9 Indeed, it can be substantiated that
there is no limited class of natural or artificial substances which
possess a unique capacity to harm allergically a given user; nor
is there a limited class of allergic users who will react adversely to
natural or artificial substances.20
To impose liability without fault upon the manufacturer for
any allergic response is to make the manufacturer the insurer of every
purchaser and user of the product. There is no product to which some
person at some time is not sensitive! If every product carried a
caution about possible allergic responses, what economic justification
would there be for such warnings when the purchaser is ordinarily
unaware of his peculiar susceptibility until he has used the product!
Legally, such a warning would provide the requisite notice of potential
allergic response which would pertain to an infinitesimal part of
the population. The reputable manufacturer who does warn may find
himself at a severe disadvantage with competitors who label their
products without any warning, in the hope of improving their com-
petitive sales position. Then again, the warning itself may generate
more liability, for it constitutes an admission of knowledge of danger,
the time that this infant became ill there was no way of determining whether the
infant would, by some idiosyncratic reaction, respond to the infinitesimal quan-
tities of lead which it is claimed were ingested with each feeding and extending
over this six or seven months' period. 173 Misc. at 956, 19 N.YS.2d at 42.
18 See Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 122, 3 A.2d 650,
653 (1939):
The implied warranty of the statute that goods sold for a known particular
purpose "shall be reasonably fit for such purpose," measures the buyer's right
of recovery, and the seller's liability. It is accordingly held that in the sale
of wearing apparel, if the article could be worn by any normal person without
harm and injury is suffered by the purchaser only because of a supersensitive
skin, there is no breach of the implied warranty of reasonable fitness of the
article for personal wear.
19 Swartz, How to Master Your Allergy, (1961).
20 In Jacquot v. WI. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958),
plaintiff was unable to show that she was "one of a class of persons sensitive to the
fingernail kit to whom the implied warranty of fitness for purpose might extend."
Even her dermatologist had testified that he "had not seen any case of such sensitivity."
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and must therefore stand the test of "sufficiency" and duty to warn
as in the Braun and Wright cases, hereinafter discussed.
Of course, the reputable manufacturer will have rigorously and
carefully conducted technical and medical testing of his product in
advance of marketing.2 He will ascertain whether his product will
evince any allergic response in a substantial number of users. He will
determine the hypoallergenic combination of ingredients, eliminating
those ingredients which have a high incidence of allergic responses
in tested persons. The reputable manufacturer will also keep abreast
of medical literature on allergy.
ALLERGY
A tort action against the manufacturer for damages resulting
from an allergic response, must encounter these basic considera-
tions:22 unforeseeability of harm, whether a reasonable person should
have anticipated an allergic response from ordinary, normal use
of the product; adequacy of notice, whether the label and/or written
instructions for use warn or caution the user about a potential allergic
response and whether such warning is necessary at all; lack of proxi-
mate cause, whether the allergic response was proximately caused by
the particular product, or was engendered by some other food, drug,
cosmetic, chemical or other consumer product; and assumption of
risk, whether the user was aware of his prior sensitization, known
idiosyncrasy or peculiar susceptibility to the particular product.
Unforeseeability of Harm
An allergic response is generally held not to be within the zone
of foreseeability, as illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court in
Bennett v. Pilot Products Co.:
21 In Wahlstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933),
the buyer of eyeglasses sued in negligence to recover damages for allergic injuries result-
ing from his use of the eyeglasses. There was expert testimony that the dye on the eye-
glass frame would not injure an ordinary person, that it was most unusual for it to cause
any ill effects, and that the injury in this case was caused by the idiosyncrasy of the
buyer's skin. The Texas court held that the buyer had failed to show either actionable
negligence, or that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. It appeared that
the only way in which the seller could have discovered the idiosyncrasy of the buyer's
skin was by testing the buyer for a period of two or three days before the sale! The
court was of the opinion that the seller was under no duty to make any such test to
ascertain whether the buyer was of the ordinary type which the dye would not affect,
or to foresee that her skin would be peculiarly susceptible to the dye of the frames.
22 "In negligence cases, duty is an obligation, recognized by the law, to conform
to a particular standard of conduct toward another. The plaintiff must be within the
class of persons to whom the duty is owed, and no action may be founded upon a
duty only to others. The prevailing view is that there can be no duty to one toward
whom no danger may reasonably be foreseen." Prosser, Torts 36 (2d ed. 1955).
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Appellant appeared to be sensitive to the mixture (permanent wave
lotion) much the same as some people respond to strawberries-
a commodity honored so frequently by the authorities in illustrating
difference in liability to the allergic in contrast to the normal indi-
vidual. We believe, that under the facts of the case, the trial judge
strained neither common sense nor realism in concluding that ap-
pellant's ailment, being the result of an allergy, was not compensa-
ble as a matter of law. We are sympathetic with appellant and her
misfortune, but cannot require the merchant to assume the role
of absolute insurer against physiological idiosyncrasy. To do so
also would invest the elusive ordinary prudent man with a quality
of foreseeability that would take him out of character completely.
Every substance, including food which is daily consumed by the
public, occasionally becomes anathema to him peculiarly allergic to
it. To require insurability against such an unforeseeable happen-
stance would weaken the structure of common sense. .... 23
A New York appellate court in Lekner v. Procter & Gamble
Distr. Co.24 specifically held that a manufacturer cannot be held
liable for negligence in the manufacture of a product in the absence
of "proof of knowledge by defendant of potential danger to a number
of persons in using its product." It was determined that the plaintiff
"did not establish that the product was harmful or inherently danger-
ous"; and, "mere redness of hands acquired by a small percentage
of those tested by the defendant unassociated with -any form of
dermatitis" is insufficient "by itself to put defendant on notice of
possible danger to users of its product."
Duty to Warn or Inadequacy of Notice
Is there a duty on the part of the product manufacturer to warn
of a possible allergic response to the given product? Admittedly, the
duty to warn about defective wheels or contaminated substances is
totally different from any possible duty to warn about a substance
which may or may not produce an allergic response in a given person.
Cause and effect of an allergic response, for example, are not open
23 Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., supra note 16, at 477-478, 235 P.2d at 527. Note
Baker v. Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1961) wherein liability
was not imposed upon a manufacturer of ready-mix concrete for dermatitis contracted
by a user, because the product was a standard mixture and the cement met all
standard specifications.
24 208 Misc. 186, 143 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1955). In Kinkead v. Lysol, Inc.,
250 App. Div. 832, 296 N.Y. Supp. 461 (1937), the New York court declared: "If she
used it [Lysol disinfectant] diluted as prescribed, it did her harm only because of
the allergy, and I am holding that is something the manufacturer does not have to
anticipate within the law of negligence."
25 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 207 (1953). See Pinto v. Clairol (Civil No. 4239)
D.C.W.D. Ky., May 2, 1962 (jury verdict on issue of adequacy of labeling and
instructions; also no proof of deleterious substance).
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to convincing proof under the present state of scientific-medical
knowledge. No qualified allergist nor dermatologist will risk his
reputation on even the medical cause (much less the legal cause)
of a given allergic response without having made a series of prophetic
patch tests with the given substance, taken a complete medical
history of the patient, and included, by similar testing, other known
antigens.
Products labeled in conformity with the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act have presumably given proper notice to the user of any
known, untoward result. Probably the strangest case to the contrary
was Schilling v. Roux Distrib. Co.2 5 wherein the Minnesota Supreme
Court gave the hair tint manufacturer a verbal spanking by holding
literally that the words, "each and every application" (in the patch
test instructions for the hair tint) did not include both a full head
application and a retouch application of the hair tint. Such ultra-
literal interpretation, it is submitted, is contrary to technical and
industry usage as well as to the common understanding of people
everywhere. The court's definitive reference was to the user's failure
to make the requisite preliminary patch or skin test for hyper-
sensitivity before each retouch application.
Proximate Cause
The causal relationship between the use of a given product and
the allergic response is a prerequisite to an action for negligence as
well as to breach of warranty action. The susceptible plaintiff must
prove that the given product, and not another product or substance,
actually and proximately caused his allergic response. The plaintiff
carries the burden of exclusion and, only after the allergen is ac-
curately isolated and confirmed by patch-testing (as well as by
discontinuance of the use of the product) can the given product be
incriminated.
Causation, based upon exclusion, had been rigorously asserted
by the highest New York court almost 35 years ago. 6 The New
York Court of Appeals furthermore pointed out the necessity for
proof that the product was inherently dangerous or deleterious before
any inference or presumption could be justified as to proximate cause
of the allergic response. Thus, where the injury was of an allergic
nature, the inference or presumption does not apply unless plaintiff
has excluded all other causes except the application or use of defend-
ant's product 27 The court here found that the evidence did not justify
26 Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y. 360, 160 N.E. 398 (1928).
27 For a listing of data necessary for evaluating medico-legal aspects of specific
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a finding that the hair tint product was inherently dangerous, but
indicated that, in any event, the proof of causal connection in this
area would have to be particularly clear to justify a verdict under
any circumstances, that is, even if negligence could somehow be
shown. Although this case has been criticized as confusing the danger-
ous instrumentality rule with proximate cause, the decision is per-
fectly clear in spelling out the sentiment of the court that the allergic
plaintiff should be held to the most precise medical evidence of causal
relationship."8 Fein v. Bonetti 9 decided in 1954, again involving a
hair dye, had the benefit of a medical opinion that defendant's product
caused the allergic injury, but the expert conceded that other sub-
stances used by the plaintiff might have caused fa similar set of
symptoms. Following the rule in Karr v. Inecto, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed a verdict in plaintiff's favor and held that plain-
tiff's evidence was not sufficient to go to a jury.
In May v. Ferrantelle,° the plaintiff allegedly sustained an
allergic response due to an application of a coal tar hair dye by the
defendant beauty salon. Admittedly, the defendant had failed to make
the preliminary patch or skin test for hypersensitivity, as required
by the instructions which accompanied the product, and under New
York City and State statutes. 1 But, despite the statutory violation,
sensitivities, see Schwartz, 'Troblems of Proof in Claims for Recovery for Dermatitis,"
41 Mich. L. Rev. 893 (1943).
28 See Nelson, "Clinical Appraisal of Dermatoses Due to Cosmetics," 163 A.M.A.J.
740-741 (1957) ; "Incidentally, when taking a history with a view to eliminating cosmetics,
it is surprising how many patients do not consider wave set, shampoo, toothpaste,
mouthwash, cologne, toilet water, and hand cream to be cosmetics. Once the diagnosis
has been determined, it may be confirmed by selective patch testing, or, better still,
by producing some recurrence of the dermatitis through limited reuse of the suspected
cosmetic."
One of the most important recent cases on proof of causation by medical testimony
is Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, decided by the New York Court of
Appeals on July 8, 1960. Here a workman's compensation death award had been made
to the widow of a man who admittedly died from leukemia. The theory of liability was
that this blood disease was caused by his eaposure to benzol contained in varnish re-
movers which the decedent used in his employment as a piano finisher. The workman's
compensation referee appointed an industrial hygiene physician to investigate and he
reported: "As this disease is one in which there is no known cause, and there are no
known substances used in any of these work places which produce symptoms and signs
similar to the signs and symptoms of this leukemia-an investigation is not able to disclose
any casual relation." Accordingly, the referee disallowed the claim, but the Board
reversed, on appeal. The highest New York court reversed and dismissed the claim
in a lengthy opinion citing as a "serious defect in claimant's case" the fact that the
'"causes of leukemia or its aggravation are unknown."
29 307 N.Y. 682, 120 N.E.2d 854 (1954).
30 N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Dec. 8, 1959.
31 Section 131 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York (now Section 77.01(1)
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plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied because of
lack of proof of proximate cause. According to Mr. Justice Lupiano:
The physician examining the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant
states that, in addition to the use of the hair dye, plaintiff's hair
was shampooed, bleached, and set and other substances were used in
the course of the process. Allergy to either the bleaching prepara-
tions, the shampoo, the hair dye, or the materials used in the setting
of the hair could produce physical conditions to be observed which
could be identical, and one could not tell with reasonable medical
certainty, from mere obseivation of the condition, which of the sub-
stances had been the cause of the reaction. The causative factor is
therefore in issue....
Similarly, in Hanrakan v. Walgreen Co. 2 the North Carolina Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff's dermatologist had made no chemical
analysis of the product, was not familiar with the ingredients of the
product, and had not confirmed his medical opinion by prophetic
patch testing with the hair tint. The court said: "The cause of
plaintiff's dermatitis remains a matter of doubt and conjecture."33
It is obvious that where evidence as to the cause of the allergic
response is lacking, it is not proper for the jury to speculate on whether
or not there was negligence or a breach of warranty. 4
Assumption of Risk
If a'patron or user has a personal idiosyncrasy or peculiar sus-
ceptibility to a given product, which fact has not been communicated
to the manufacturer, the product manufacturer cannot be held liable
for the alleged injury, for the user may be said to have assumed the
risk of such use of the product. In Bennett v. Pilot Products Co.,35 the
Supreme Court of Utah refused recovery of any damages by a beau-
and Section 163.09(e) of the New York City Health Code) and Section 6810(1)(a)
of the New York State Education Law.
32 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
33 Id. at 269, 90 S.E.2d at 393.
34 See the Ohio Court of Appeals decision in Leach v. Joyce Products Co., 66 Ohio
L. Abs. 296, 116 N.E.2d 834 (1952).
35 Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., supra note 16.
Note Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Deakins, 305 Ky. 385, 390, 204 S.W.2d
434, 437, (1947). On the question of assumed risk where a female employee with
acne continued to immerse her hands in a solution which aggravated her condition:
We conclude, therefore, that the defendant violated no duty which it owed
to the plaintiff, and while there might have been a recurrence of the malady,
aggravated by the dangers of the work, the knowledge of her sensitive skin
and pre-existing condition, coupled with her knowledge of the effect on the skin
of other employees, places the responsibility upon her and not upon the Westing-




tician who sustained dermatitis of the hands following use of a
permanent wave preparation on her patron. The beautician was
deemed to have assumed the risk by failing to disclose her known
sensitivity or idiosyncrasy to the manufacturer (or, in lieu therof,
abstaining from the use of the product) prior to the use of the product
in her business.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
It is submitted that an unpredictable or unknown pre-existing
disposition of a given person to a given product cannot be contem-
plated by the parties to a contract of sale, and therefore cannot give
rise to an implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for
particular purpose. Indeed, it was held by the Tenth Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals36 that, since "warranties do not extend to injuries
caused by peculiar idiosyncrasies or physical condition of a user
which are not reasonably foreseeable," no breach of such implied
warranties is possible. Similarly, if it is contended that allergenicity
is inherent to or natural with the given product, (much like a frag-
ment of a chicken bone has been held natural to chicken pie,3 7 or
like a broken prune pit is natural to prune butter)38 then no implied
warranty can arise, much less be breached. Otherwise, a manufacturer
would become an insurer of his product when his legal obligation is
merely that the product should be reasonably merchantable and
reasonably fit for its intended use by a normal person. "Merchant-
ability" is "medium quality" or "fair average quality," 9 and "fitness
for particular purpose" is appropriateness for average, normal use,
reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it is sold. 0
A manufacturer may furnish in the product instructions a simple
notice to the user, such as "This product, like any product, may
evince an allergic response in a susceptible person. If so, discontinue
its use." Such a manufacturer may have prejudiced his position by the
admission that his product can produce an allergic reaction, even if
confined to a susceptible person. A plaintiff sustaining an allergic
response would bring himself within the "class" of persons to be
protected by the warranty, provided that he had previously sustained
an allergic response upon first use of the product. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judical Court has said that warranties must be taken with
3 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
37 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
38 Courter v. Dilbert Bros. Inc., 186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
30 35 Ohio Jur. 875 (1934).
40 Dunbar v. Consolidated Iron Steel Co., 23 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 599 (1927), and Cullen v. Brimm, 37 Ohio St. 236 (1881).
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the product instructions against continued use by persons with al-
lergies,4 ' and, therefore, failure to cease the use of the product in
accordance with instructions accompanying it, would bar a successful
action for breach of warranty as well as constitute contributory
negligence in a negligence action. Two years later, the same court in
Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,42 directed a verdict for the re-
tailer of an underarm deodorant upon similar reasoning. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., summarized
the principle:
... There is no liability upon the seller, [for an alleged breach of
warranty] where the buyer is allergic or unusually susceptible to
injury from the product, which fact was wholly unknown to the
seller and peculiar to the buyer.43
The New Jersey Superior Court also declared that there can be no
breach of warranty without proof of defective product.44 And, a
product to which a given person is allergic is not a "defective"
product. If the product was properly made and is not unreasonably
dangerous to the normal, average consumer, the product is not de-
fective! The Supreme Court of Ohio in Allen v. Grafton45 sensibly
adopted a "reasonable expectations" test for oyster shells in oysters:
what do consumers reasonably expect to find in the product? Indeed,
consumers do reasonably expect that some persons at some time may
evince an allergic response to a given product! Such a product is not
"defective" merely because someone is allergic to it!
DEFENSES TO A BREACH OF WARRANTY ACTION
If a breach of warranty action alleging an allergic response is to
be successful, the plaintiff must overcome such obvious defenses,
among others, as lack of privity contract, including limited ex-
tension of the benefits of a warranty to others than the purchaser,
written disclaimers of liability, and tort defenses generally.
Privity of contract presumes a sale of a product, not the render-
ing of a service by a third party with the product. The application
of cosmetic products in a beauty salon, the injection of a prescrip-
tion drug by the attending physician, or the service of food in a
restaurant, except for a statute to the contrary, do not give rise to a
sale, and hence there could be no privity of contract. Moreover, there
41 Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., supra note 20.
42 Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 10.
43 Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., supra note 32, at 269, 90 S.E.2d at 393.
44 Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (1961), the
product being a medicated prescriptive shampoo.
45 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
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has been little honesty on the part of many plaintiffs' counsels in the
rush to discard the doctrine of privity. Today's boxscore would show
that 29 states and the District of Columbia still adhere to the neces-
sity for "privity of contract," while only 17 states profess to have
abandoned "privity of contract." (Only Alaska, New Mexico, Vermont
and Wyoming have no recent decisions on the point.) 46
The rush to dump "privity" has been evident in Ohio since the
Rogers47 decision in 1958. The plaintiff, after having a permanent
wave lotion applied to her hair by her mother, found that her hair had
assumed a cotton-like texture, had become gummy, and when the
curlers were removed, her hair fell off to within one-half inch of
her scalp. The plaintiff thereupon brought action against the out-of-
state manufacturer for breach of warranty. The Supreme Court of
Ohio ruled that privity was not necessary because express representa-
tions were made by the defendant manufacturer in his TV advertise-
ments directly into the home of the purchaser, who was induced to
purchase the home permanent wave product in reliance upon the
express warranty. Plaintiff's hair breakage was therefore compen-
sable; the manufacturer had negligently represented its product to
plaintiff's detriment. Note that the product was in fact sold under
its patent or trade-name so that an implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose would not exist, and there could be no reliance by
the purchaser upon the seller's skill or judgment.48 Thus, the modus
operandi for liability was the breach of an "unexpressed" express
warranty. Note that the case involved an alleged primary irritant,
and not an allergen.
Even the Greenberg v. Lorenz4" decision in 1961 by the highest
New York court has not resulted in any clear-cut disavowal of the
"privity" doctrine." Indeed, the decision has been subsequently con-
46 For an up-to-date compilation, see the author's Defense Research Institute
monograph, "Products Liability," (1962), pp. 21-23.
Note two Ohio cases requiring privity of contract, Steele v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 107 Ohio App. 379, 159 N.E.2d 469 (1958), and Jordan v. Brower, 86 Ohio
App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
47 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958),
a 4-3 decision aff'g 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E.2d 871 (1957).
48 It is of interest to note that the Ohio Supreme Court a year later in Janko v.
Roux Distributing Co., 170 Ohio St. 48, 162 N.E.2d 124 (1959), affirmed a dismissal
of a complaint by a consumer against the manufacturer, because the evidence clearly
showed that the consumer, "in the purchase of defendant product, did not do so by
reason of any direct representations (or express warranties) of the defendant as to
the quality of its product."
49 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
50 See Mr. Justice Hockert's decision in Samet v. Brestone (New York City
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strued by New York courts as a mere extension of the benefits of
warranty to a member of the household of the purchaser5 ' and limited
to "foods and household goods. 112
Court, Queens County, May 8, 1961): "There must be a warranty or there is no basis
for this action. Neither of these defendants did any wrong. . . . The recent case of
Greenberg v. Lorenz has no application here. . . . As far as the facts in this case are
concerned the law has not been changed. Warranty does not run with the chattel."
On Feb. 22, 1962, the New York Court of Appeals, however, in Randy Knit-
wear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E. 399 (1962), took an
independent course with respect to privity of contract. The case involved a $208,000
property damage claim occasioned by defendant's allegedly false representation of its
textile finishing process making a treated fabric unshrinkable. Suit was brought on an
express warranty against the process manufacturer and against its process licensees who
had actually sold plaintiff their own fabrics which they presumably treated with
"Cyana Shrinkage Control Finish."
The court merely affirmed the lower court's determination denying American
Cyanamid's motion for summary judgment, and did not discuss the case on its merits.
The majority opinion remanded the case with a terse statement that it was "im-
possible to justify the manufacturer's denial of liability on the sole ground of absence
of technical privity." Since "privity" is dependent upon a "sale," it is strange that
the majority opinion did not identify any "product" sold by American Cyanamid to
the plaintiff. judge Fuld admitted that "the article sold by the appellant, resin, is
different from that purchased by the plaintiff, fabric," but he did not explain just
what, if anything, the resin manufacturer had sold the plaintiff I
The truth of the matter is that the product utilizing the Cyana process (a chemical
resin) was sold by its licensees to the plaintiff. Hence, the court was in error in
assuming that privity applied in the absence of a sale of a product. judge Fuld also
skirted the issue of contributory negligence in use of the process by Fairtex and Apex.
Indeed, he proclaimed that Cyanamid has subsequently an "appropriate recourse"
against them. Why should the resin manufacturer be in the direct line of fire from the
purchaser of a fabric which the resin manufacturer did not manufacture?
Thus, it can be only dictum that the privity rule was dispensed with. Indeed,
privity of contract is still a prerequisite in New York, for fabrics clearly do not come
within the limitation of "food and household goods," as set forth in Greenberg v. Lorenz,
9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d. 773 (1961) which simply extended the benefits of war-
ranties of such products to members of the household of the purchaser. It is of interest
to note that in 1960 the Federal District Court in New York in McDonald v. Blue
jeans Corp., 183 F. Supp. 149 denied recovery to a retailer (who had settled with
the injured purchaser) against a fabric manufacturer because of lack of privity of
contract, in that the material had been purchased from an intermediate distributor.
See also, Deeves v. Fabrics Fire House Co., 29 Misc. 2d 136, 210 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct.
1961). Furthermore, the judicially-made exceptions to the privity rule pertain to personal
injuries, and do not extend to damages to personal property. Russell v. Session Clock
Co., 19 Conn. Super. 425, 116 A.2d 575 (1955), cf. Amie v. Lame, 226 N.Y.S.2d 832
(App. Div. 1962). If the instant decision implies a breach of warranty on the part
of defendant, then the court should have required proof of a defect in the product
sold by defendant. In addition, the court should have viewed evidence of tort defenses,
such as possible intervening negligence on the part of the licensees, for if the fabric
was not properly treated with the Cyana process, the product sold by the licensees to
plaintiff would not be shrinkage-resistant. In the last analysis, this case was actually
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The privity requirement indeed gives the product manufacturer
a necessary shield against the exaggerated and the fraudulent claim.
A high percentage of claims are downright fraudulent or grossly
exaggerated. Retention of the privity requirement compels a plain-
tiff to sue, upon a sale of the product, the immediate vendor, who
may, in turn, if warranted, recoup his loss against his distributor
and eventually the manufacturer. The accessibility of the product
manufacturer has too frequently lightened the plaintiff's burden of
proof of "fault," and even encouraged courts to predict liability upon
ability to pay."
determined in tort, i.e., plaintiff's reliance upon defendant's express fraudulent representa-
tion in garment tags affixed to the fabric (as held by the concurring opinion of judge
Froessel), and therefore the majority opinion's attack upon the privity doctrine was
unnecessary.
Also note Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962), on a
dealer's liability for a defective chair sold to a dentist. The dental technician was in-
jured when the chair collapsed. Recovery against dealer upheld upon breach of im-
plied warranty.
51 In Anderson v. Radio Corporation of America, 211 N.Y.S.2d 337, the New York
Supreme Court, Nassau County, on October 26, 1961, declared:--"Although recently in
Greenberg v. Lorenz it was held that not merely the individual buyer but all the members
of a household benefit by a warranty as to food and household goods, it has not been held
that a buyer or member of his household may sue a manufacturer with whom the buyer
had no contract .. ." (Emphasis added.)
On the necessity for privity of contract to support a cause of action for warranty,
see the following recent New York cases: Colonial Boiler Service Inc. v. Blau, New
York Supreme Court, Bronx County, Apr. 19, 1961; and Monac v. Chrysler Sales Corp.,
191 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Also, note Cioiola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 1961); Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Assn., 30 Il. App.
2d 283, 174 N.E.2d 697 (1961); and Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d
923 (1961).
52 For example, Rypins v. Rowan, 219 N.Y.S.2d 288, in which the New York
Supreme Court, Nassau County, on September 9, 1961, refused to include combination
screen doors within the definition of "household goods." In Levitt v. Ford Motor Co.,
215 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1961) the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, excluded
automobiles from the impact of the Greenberg case, and declared: "As the law presently
stands, it does not appear that the Greenberg case has abolished, with respect to all
forms of merchandise, the ancient doctrine that privity of contract is necessary to
support an action for breach of warranty." After the Randy Knitwear decision, supra
note 50 the complaint was amended to include breach of warranty.
53 See Simmons v. Witchita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633
(1957). The action in warranty by a remote vendee against the bottler involved a book
of matches in a bottled beverage. Defendant's appeal was based on the exclusion by
the trial court of certain of its evidence. Defendant had sought to show the care used
in its washing and bottling operations. It had also sought to introduce a series of
experiments conducted by its chemist which tended to prove that a book of matches
could not survive those operations. The trial court refused to admit any of this evidence,
and this action was affirmed on appeal. The court was fully aware that defendant's
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In May 1960, almost two years after the Rogers decision, the
Ohio Court of Appeals in Kennedy v. General Beauty Products, Inc.54
expressly ruled that the Rogers case had not modified the prevailing
Ohio principle enunciated in Wood v. General Electric Co.5 that "no
action may be maintained against a manufacturer for injury, based
upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so furnished" in the
absence of privity of contract. Judge Skeel solemnly declared: "Until
the Wood case is modified, it is our duty to follow the law as there
set out." In effect, the defendant, in the sale of the hair dye, only had
a duty to see that the product sold would not be dangerous to a normal
evidence was offered to prove that it did not breach its warranty. However, in that
connection, the court said: "In order for defendant to avoid liability under its warranty,
it must show who contaminated the beverage and not merely that the defendant itself
did not." This shocking revelation that a defendant is guilty until he proves himself
innocent, i.e., he must prove the guilt of another to exonerate himself, explains why
manufacturers must fight to retain the privity requirement! How else can the manu-
facturer be assured that the court will accept his defense? In effect, the Kansas Supreme
Court imposed "liability without fault."
54 112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960). Initially the Rogers case received
the plaudits of a federal appellate court in Arfons v. E. I. duPont and Ensign-Bickford
Co., 257 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958). Plaintiff was severely injured while working with
duPont dynamite, which had a fuse manufactured by Ensign-Bickford. The accident
presumably occurred in Ohio (although this was not indicated in complaint). Arfons
sued both duPont and Ensign-Bickford in a federal district court in Connecticut where
defendant Ensign-Bickford was doing business, and his complaint based on breach of
warranty was dismissed upon the ground that under Ohio and Connecticut law, recovery
was not possible because of the absence of privity of contract between Arfons and the
two companies. On appeal, Arfons asked for a reversal of the dismissal on the strength
of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in the Rogers case which apparently did not
require privity of contract. The court agreed and remanded the case for a trial; holding
that if, under any reasonable reading, the complaint states a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court must allow the case to be heard. Express warranties were
evident in advertisements and literature that the products were safe for the purpose
for which they were sold when used in accordance with instructions. Since the injury
probably occurred in Ohio, it is conceivable according to the court, that the Connecticut
choice of law would require the application of Ohio law which no longer seemed to
require privity of contract in warranty actions.
55 159 Ohio St. 273, 11 N.E.2d 8 (1953). This case involved the purchase of an
electric blanket from an independent dealer. The blanket was used by the purchaser
for approximately two months, and then it was noticed that the blanket was smoldering
in three or four spots. The blanket was taken from the bed and carried out of the bedroom.
Later, it was discovered that the mattress on the bed was on fire. The mattress fire
could not be extinguished, and considerable damage resulted to the premises. In dis-
cussing the question of implied warranty, the Ohio Supreme Court definitely ruled
that there must be contractual privity between the seller and buyer, and that, although
a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from the manufacturer,
no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by the subpurchaser based upon
implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased.
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person, if and when used in the manner as directed by the instructions.
Here was an appeal from a jury verdict denying recovery to the plain-
tiff against the cosmetic manufacturer. The plaintiff had assigned as
error the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the warranty
of fitness running against the remote manufacturer. Judge Skeel
tersely declared that, "There is no claim in this case of privity... (the
facts make privity impossible) .. . ."5
The benefits of a warranty are generally available only to the
immediate purchaser who is in privity with the seller. The purchaser's
spouse, children, employees, and others in close relation to him, have
been held to be outside the protection of such a warranty. Courts
have, however, implied the existence of an "agency" and "third
party beneficiary" relationship, in order to circumvent the unjust
discrimination against such known non-purchasers as members of the
family or household injured by the use of the product. The result
has been an extension of warranties, by statute such as Sec. 2-318
of the Uniform Commercial Code, which extends the warranty to
"lany natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer,
or who is a guest in his home, if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods, and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty."'5 s
In October 1961 the Connecticut Supreme Court extended the
benefit of implied warranties to a remote user of a household deter-
gent that spilled upon the user. 9 Both the manufacturer and the
retailer demurred to the allegations of breach of certain express and
implied warranties derived from radio, television, and newspaper
advertisements, upon the ground that there was "no privity of contract
nor any sale between them and the named plaintiff," which demurrer
the trial court sustained. Associate Justice Murphy, on appeal, found
error, set aside the judgment for the defendants, and remanded the
613 Id. at 508, 167 N.E.2d at 119.
57 In both Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d
25 (1959), complaint dismissed by New York Court of Appeals (1960), and in Greenberg
v. Lorenz, 7 App. Div. 2d 968 (1959), the New York courts refused to extend the
warranty to plaintiff's husband and plaintiff's daughter, respectively. (The Greenberg
case was subsequently reversed on appeal, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
58 As of January, 1964, twenty-eight states will have adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. They are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
GO Hamon v. Digliani, 149 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961).
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case accordingly. His opinion, which overturned Connecticut prece-
dents that an action for breach of express or implied warranties re-
quired "evidence of a contract between the parties," highlighted the
untrue belief that privity of contract was no longer an essential
element of recovery in most jurisdictions.60 The court furthermore
overlooked the fact that the plaintiff-purchaser may have been guilty
of contributory negligence in handling of the product. Contributory
negligence or intervening negligence is an appropriate defense to a
breach of warranty action, as is evident in the Silverman case61 in
Connecticut. Although the justice of the situation may be logically
commendable, there was no need for the court to dismiss so cate-
gorically the prerequite privity of contract doctrine.62
Written disclaimers of liability, if not unconscionable, are in
effect express warranties which preclude implied warranties to the
contrary. The fact that the "liability without fault" doctrine has
been frequently foisted upon the contract theory of implied warranty,
prompted many manufacturers and sellers to "contract out" of this
kind of blind liability by means of express disclaimers. A disclaimer
in strong and specific language would be inconsistent with the war-
ranty, and therefore would bar recovery on breach of such warranty.
In the Vandiver case 63 the Kentucky court upheld an express disclaimer
of liability for mechanical failure of an air compressor. However,
in the Burr case,64 the California court held the following disclaimer
to be inadequate to bar recovery for damages due to an insecticide
spray: "Seller makes no warranty of any kind, express or implied,
concerning the use of this product. Buyer assumes all risk in use
or handling, whether in accordance with directions or not."65 But, if
60 See authorities cited supra note 46.
61 Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954).
62 The Connecticut court relied in great measure upon the New York decision in
Greenberg v. Lorenz, which extended the benefits of warranty to a person other than
the purchaser of a food product. Associate Justice Murphy failed to note that the
Greenberg case did not directly involve the manufacturer of the food product.
63 Vandiver v. B. B. Wilson Co., 224 Ky. 601, 51 S.W.2d 899 (1932).
64 IBurr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
65 Some typical disclaimers are as follows: "This writing ... constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties hereto, there being no warranties or representations by
the seller except as set forth herein." Stryker v. Rush, 187 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
"We give no warranty, express or implied, as to description, quality, productiveness
or any other matter ... and will be in no way responsible for the (product) ... and the
purchaser hereby waives the right of refusal and return of goods which is usually
connected with non-warranty." Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
"We believe this product to be safe if used under the direction of a physician (or
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the disclaimer here had specifically referred to impurities in the spray,
there is a likelihood that the California court would have upheld the
disclaimer. Incidentally, the famous 1960 Henningsen decision66 in
New Jersey, in which an automobile disclaimer was invalidated,6"
was not persuasive to the New York Supreme Court in Fink v. Oakes68
wherein the defendant auto dealer's motion for summary judgment
was granted:
The original order signed by plaintiff, immediately above her signa-
ture, contains this provision: "Read conditions on back.-It is
expressly understood and agreed that this order is given and ac-
cepted subject to all conditions on the reverse side, and no other."
On the reverse side, the contract includes the following provision:
"The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle manufactured
by it to be free of defects in material and workmanship under
normal use and service . . .within ninety (90) days after making
delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or before such
vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles . . . ; this Warranty being
in accordance with accompanying directions). We cannot guarantee however that
the use of this product will not produce unfortunate results in some persons. This
product is sold without warranty, express or implied, against injuries resulting from
its use." Chemical Week (Feb. 21, 1958) p. 111.
66 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
67 "Disclaimer clauses like the one in Henningsen have been upheld in many
jurisdictions: Nephi Processing Plant Inc. v. Western Co-op Hatcheries, 242 F.2d 567
(10th Cir. 1957); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958)
(storage bin-no warranties except replacement of defective parts within 60 days);
Donnelly v. Governair Corp., 145 F. Supp. 699 (NJ). Cal. 1946) (refrigeration equip-
ment); Moss v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 310 S.W.2d 491 (1958) (farm machinery);
Wilson v. Eargle, 98 Ga. App. 241, 105 S.E.2d 474 (1958) (boat, motor, and trailer);
Columbia Loan Co. v. Parks, 97 Ga. App. 76, 102 S.E.2d 46 (1958) (disclaimer excluded
all warranties except warranties of title); Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301, 310 P.2d
923 (1957), (machinery of standard make); National Trailer Sales Co. v. Pate, 213
Md. 69, 130 A.2d 747 (1957), ('no warranties expressed or implied' excluded implied
warranty of merchantability in contract of sales for a house trailer-leaky roof) ; Hall v.
Everett Motors Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960), (auto dealer not liable for
fire damage caused by faulty directional lights); Mullins v. San Scism Motor Inc.,
331 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1960); Hargrove v. Lewis, 313 S.W.2d 594 (1958); Kennedy
v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945), (we give no warranty
express or implied'); Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931), ("no
warranties extended unless expressly written herein" was held to void implied war-
ranties); Norton Buick Co. v. E. W. Tune Co., 351 P.2d 731 (Okla. 1960) (auto manu-
facturer's standard disclaimer precluded buyer from rescinding contract on ground of
breach of any implied warranty); Dimoff v. Ernie Mayer Inc., 55 Wash. 2d. 385, 347
P.2d 1056 (1960); McDonald Credit Serv. Inc. v. Church, 49 Wash. 2d 400, 301 P.2d
1082 (1956); Jones v. Mallon, 3 Wash. 2d 382, 101 P.2d 332 (1940), (seller makes
no representations or guarantees); Hykand v. G. C. A. Tractor & Equip. Co., 274
Wis. 586, 80 N.W.2d 771 (1957), (power shovel)." 46 Cornell L. Q. 617 (1961).
68 N.Y. Sup. Ct. King's County, Feb. 28, 1961.
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expressly in lieu of all other warranties express or implied and of
all other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes
nor authorizes any other person to assume for it any liability in
connection with the sale of its vehicles." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no prohibition against waiving these rights because section
152 of the Personal Property Law specifically states: "Where any
right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a
sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement . . . " (emphasis supplied) and that is just what was
done by this plaintiff .... 69
In the typical allergy situation the manufacturer of the product
may disclaim liability expressly on the label of the product, to wit:
"This product is safe if used in accordance with the notice and the
accompanying directions. No guarantee can be given that the use of
this product may not produce unfortunate results in some persons.
Therefore, no express or implied warranties are given as to freedom
from ANY asserted unfavorable effect or result which may be ascribed
to the use of the product."70 It is advisable to preface such a written
disclaimer with a general statement or notice that certain individuals,
for undetermined reasons, may be allergic or hypersensitive to any
product that is harmless to the overwhelming multitude of users. Should
69 It has generally been held that a disclaimer or exculpatory clause is enforceable
if the statement expressly makes no warranty of any kind except those expressly stated,
and that the buyer assumes all risk of liability whatsoever resulting from the use of the
material. Today, when it is customary for manufacturers to make express warranties
of materials and workmanship for limited periods, it is desirable to include language
to the effect that "this warranty (disclaimer) is expressly made in lieu of all other
warranties, express or implied, and of all other obligations or liabilities on our part."
Hence, the disclaimer disclaims the existence of any express or implied warranties, and
if not unconscionable is readily enforceable. See Charles Lachman Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1948), and Shafer v. Reo Motors Co., 205 F.2d
685 (3d Cir. 1953). A disclaimer may, however, be applicable only to express warranties,
McPeak v. Baker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
70 In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F. Supp. 122 (SD.V. Va.,
1953) a third party sued a marketer of a drink for injuries sustained when a bottle
exploded. The marketer's insurer settled the claim, and, being subrogated, sued the
bottle manufacturer, one count being in warranty and the other in negligence. The
manufacturer pleaded the contract of sale which contained not only a disclaimer
of warranty but a condition that the manufacturer should not, in case of broken or
"defective" bottles, "be liable in any event for loss of contents or for special or con-
sequential damages of any kind." As to the warranty count, the court declared: "Not
only is there no express warranty, but there is an express provision excluding any
warranty. In the presence of such an agreement between the parties, no implied warranty
arises." As to the negligence count, it was said: "A party to a contract may limit or
disavow entirely liability for his own negligence, insofar as such liability would other-
wise accrue to the other party to the contract," the exception to such general rule not
being applicable here. A motion by the manufacturer for judgment on the pleadings
was granted.
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an allergic reaction occur, the user is advised to discontinue use of the
product until patch-testing confirms or denies that the given product
was the offending allergen. A vendor may also disclaim liability for
any warranty expressly or impliedly made by the manufacturer. 71
The defenses to a breach of warranty action are not limited to
those of a contractual origin. Such tortious defenses as contributory
negligence by the users, 72 assumption of the risk,73 unusual or ab-
normal use of the product,74 and independent, intervening act of negli-
gence by user or third party75 are available. Proof of proximate cause
is obviously a requisite under negligence or breach of warranty.76
Should the user not read and follow all the printed material on the
label of the product, recovery for injuries is generally barred.77 Sim-
ilarly, in the Natale case7" involving injuries from a bursting soda
bottle, the New York Appellate Division reversed a $200,000 judg-
ment for the plaintiff consumer because careless handling of the bottle
by the plaintiff between the time of purchase and the time of the acci-
dent negated any possible breach of implied warranty of merchanta-
bility. In the Worley case7" a waitress in a restaurant had sustained a
skin irritation on her hands and arms from use of "Tide," a detergent
manufactured by the defendant. On the box of "Tide" was the state-
ment, "Kind to Your Hands." In an action for breach of warranty the
Missouri court denied recovery, holding that the injury was the result
of an allergy and not of any poisonous substance in the product. The
court declared that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show
71 In Miller v. Klindworth, 98 N.W.2d 109 (1959) the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that an intermediate vender of seed may, under Sec. 4-0915 of the N.D.
Rev. Code, not only rely in good faith upon the label affixed to a container of agricultural
seed by a shipper or grower thereof, but in reselling such seed, he is not precluded from
disclaiming any responsibility for, or any express or implied warranty under, such
label. The disclaimer language was held effective against a claim for damages arising
from the seed purchaser's failure to obtain the yield which the purchase should ordinary
have produced.
72 Contributory negligence is good defense in action for breach of implied warranty,
Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955); also 23 Air & Comm. los
(1956); 1953 Wis. Rev. 109.
73 Alpert v. Head Ski Co., 170 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1958).
74 Vincent v. Tsikas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d 268 (1958).
75 See Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1957).
76 See Curry v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 Ohio L. Abs. 569, 119 N.E.2d 142 (C.P."
1954).
77 See Swift & Co. v. Phillips, 314 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1958).
78 Natale v. Pepsi Cola Co., 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
70 Worley v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (1952).
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that she was a normal person who used the detergent in a normal
manner, but that it was still injurious to her skin.80
A REVISIT To THREE LEADING CASES
Braun v. Roux Distributing Co.8
One of the extreme cases which has been wholly misunderstood
by both bench and bar is the Braun case, decided by the Missouri
Supreme Court in 1958. The product involved was a standard hair
tint of the oxidation type, which constitutes perhaps 95% of all hair
colorings sold on the market today. Some 60 million American women
color their hair. This product contained less than one-tenth of one
percent of a coal tar derivative (known as PPD), which is admittedly
a sensitizer to a susceptible person. The Federal Food, Drug & Cos-
metic Act has since 1938 required the product to bear a cautionary
label."2 By its terms the label calls for a preliminary patch or skin
test for hypersensitivity 24 hours before each and every application
of the product. The plaintiff after her 20th application suddenly
ascertained that she was suffering from "a very rare and unusually
fatal malady" known as periarteritis nodosa, an inflammatory disease
of the arteries. 5 Admittedly, according to the court, "the cause of the
disease is unknown," and both sides conceded that "there has never
been either a reported or an established case of periarteritis nodosa
caused by allergic reaction to paraphenylenediamine hair dye ....
There are of course no comparable cases,"4 this being the first instance
in the history of law or medicine of periarteritis nodosa caused by al-
legeric reaction to paraphenylenediamine."8 5 There was uncontra-
80 The evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur in a negligence action is not applicable
where the circumstances surrounding the injury are not of such a character as to
warrant the conclusion, that in the ordinary course of events, such injury would not
have occurred if ordinary care had been observed. See Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St.
506, 172 N.W.2d 708 (1961); Glowacki v. Northwestern Ohio R. & P. Co., 116 Ohio St.
451, 157 N.E. 21 (1927); Reckman v. Keiter 109 Ohio App. 81, 164 N.E.2d 448 (1960);
Krysiak v. Acme Wire Co., 169 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ohio 1959); and Krupar v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
81 312 S.W.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1958).
82 Section 601(2) of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act as amended. 21 U.S.C.
361, 52 Stat. 1054 (1938).
83 See Pirrung v. Weisbrod, 39 Pa. D&C 196 (1940), and Schilling v., Roux Distr. Co.,
240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953). See Jiggetts v. Figueroa, 21 Misc. 2d 280, 199
N.Y.S.2d 789 (1959) on duty of beauty salon to make patch or skin test, and Neely v.
St. Francis Hospital, 188 Kan. 546, 363 P.2d 438 (1961) on failure of hospital to make skin
test.
84 According to the court, ."... because of the difficulty of accurate diagnosis,
most of the cases were identified and diagnosed by autopsy."
85 Again, according to the court, "Some known, or said to be known, causes
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dicted evidence 6 that some 75 million applications of the product had
been made without a single known case of this systemic injury. There
was no evidence or even a suggestion of any test that might have dis-
closed the likelihood of plaintiff's malady.
Yet on this record the Missouri court affirmed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff in the final amount of $65,000. Indeed, the court lashed
out with its invidious doctrine of liability without fault, despite the
absence of any negligence on the part of the product manufacturer. The
warnings given by the defendant could hardly be deemed insufficient"
for the cautionary statement complied fully with the requirements of
federal law.88
To have demanded that the defendant give a further warning to this
plaintiff of unknown but possible systemic injury was the height of fu-
tility and foolishness. Indeed, no one including the defendant (and also
the plaintiff) could have known beforehand9 that plaintiff could have
of the disease-some of the witnesses said that the definite cause has never been stated-
are drugs, kidney infections, serums of all kinds, blood transfusions, sulpha drugs,
penicillin, and phenobarbital."
86 On the important issue of admissibility of evidence, the Missouri court stated
that medical articles concerning paraphenylenediamine (the alleged toxic ingredient in
the hair tint which allegedly caused plaintiff to become afflicted with periarteritis nodosa)
had no probative value in that the medical cases reviewed in the articles were not
shown to have been in any way similar to plaintiff's use of defendant's tint. But never-
theless, these articles were admitted in plaintiff's behalf, because the articles were not
offered as substantive proof of the fact of truth of their contents, but upon the essential
element and theory of plaintiff's case that the defendant knew or should have known
of the unreasonable risk and foreseeable danger of serious systemic injury to some
people from the use of paraphenylenediamine in its hair dye.
87 The distributor (and manufacturer) was not permitted to object to the trial
court's manner of interpretation to the jury of the book of instructions as a matter of
law (rather than as a matter of fact), since they failed to take exception thereto in
the trial court, and also because it appeared that at the time of the trial both parties
were of the opinion that the question was one of law for the court. Proof of the harmful
ingredients in the bottle causing the harm was not required of the plaintiff, strange
as it may seem.
88 Note that in Phillips v. Roux Laboratories, 286 App. Div. 549, 145 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1955), the adequacy of the patch test instructions was upheld: "Just as failure
to comply with a statute and regulations promulgated thereunder is evidence of
negligence, full compliance therewith is some evidence of the exercise of due care in
preparing and publishing instructions for the guidance of consumers in the use of hair dye
preparation containing a coal-tar product."
89 Since the early case of Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), the Ohio Supreme
Court has held that the opinion of a witness must relate to the time about which the
witness is being examined. See Scaglioni v. Oriti, 83 Ohio App. 351, 83 N.E.2d 657 (1948).
An analogous approach as in LaPorte v. U.S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263
(D.C.N.J. 1935) should have been taken. This case involved radium necrosis suffered
by a luminous watch dial painter, where the court very carefully noted that the case
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contracted periarteritis nodosa after use of defendant's product. It is
difficult to understand how compliance with the federal labeling require-
ments as to coal tar hair dyes can afford any protection to the manu-
facturer, if a state court can, without statutory notice, add to the
federal requirements and impose liability upon general principles of a
greater duty to warn than prescribed for all such hair colorings by
federal law.
The Missouri Supreme Court in 1958 talked about "fair com-
pensation in view of the nature, extent and permanency of the in-
juries."90 Mrs. Braun received a $65,000 judgment-and yet in July
1962, upon information and belief, she resided in a newly purchased
home in North St. Louis, a healthy, active housewife with two children,
who each Wednesday bowled, was active in a neighborhood bridge club
and did her own housework and wash! 9'
Wright v. Carter Products92
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1957 in the
Wright case ruled that, despite the susceptible plaintiff's allergic re-
action to the underarm deodorant, the manufacturer was liable "in
negligence for failure to discharge that duty (to warn) by inserting
appropriate words of caution" in the labelling of the product. The
federal court opined that such "liability is rightly borne as one of
the costs of production and selling a commodity for use by members
of the public, whose knowledge of the potential danger to themselves
may be greatly inferior to that possessed by the manufacturer.
'9 3
Here exactly 373 complaints had been received by the manufacturer
about his deodorant product, the sales of which exceeded 82 million
jars. In the Merrill case94 (where no liability was found), out of 500
million packages of permanent wave lotion sold by the entire indus-
try, only two cases of the allergic optic neuritis had been even re-
ported. Thus, the Wright case can only be understood as an instance
of imposed statutory liability based upon two Massachusetts statutes
which prohibit false advertising and misbranding. Yet what evidence
of statutory violation was there other than that misconstrued by
bad to be decided on the fact as they existed in the light of the scientific and medical
knowledge of 1917 to 1920 when decedent was injured, rather than in the light of the
rapidly advanced scientific knowledge existing later at the time of the law suit.
90 Braun v. Roux Distr. Co., supra note 81, at 768.
91 Yet the court had characterized the plaintiff: "She has not been cured-Airs.
Braun has been very ill and may continue to be."
92 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
93 Id. at 59.
94 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
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by the court in noting the Federal Trade Commission order 5 years
after the plaintiff had commenced to use the product?
To substantiate its descision in reversing and remanding the case,
the court held that the date of the allergic accident was the date of
of last use, not the prior date of the onset of the allergy, and despite
the fact the plaintiff sustained a rash upon a prior use, her subsequent
use which resulted in another allergic response was with legal impunity-
no contributory negligence was averred. Indeed, how speculative it is
to argue that plaintiff would have heeded a warning if a warning were
given! Plaintiff was aware of the risk in the subsequent use of the
product.
On the charge of negligent advertising of the product, the plain-
tiff submitted no proof of reliance upon such representations. Despite
the lack of any evidence that the manufacturer was negligent in the
manufacture of the product, the court quietly skimmed over the
trial court's finding of fact that "the injury suffered by the plaintiff
was the result of her own allergy rather than being caused by any
inherent defect in the product itself." The court completely over-
looked, on the issue of foreseeability of an allergic reaction, the
1956 decision of its federal district court in Cumbert v. Household
Research Corp.n There was no judicial basis whatsoever for the
court's indulgence in a "presumption that the defendant was aware
of the possibility of injury from the use of its product," and the
manufacturer's "status as an expert in the formulation and use of
chemicals for deodorant purposes" is de minimis when compared
with plaintiff's awareness of her own prior allergic response to the
product.
Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc. 6
A directed verdict for the retailer of hair remover was set aside
and a new trial ordered by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecti-
cut, despite the higher court's admission that directions for its use
made it known to the purchaser that it could injuriously affect one
who might be allergic to some substance or ingredient contained in
it. According to the court:
Authorities agree that a buyer who, having a unique or peculiar
sensitivity, suffers injury from some innocent substance should
not be entitled to recover damages from the seller .... The medical
profession had made an extensive study of allergies. It has found
that the human body may become sensitized to a substance so that,
05 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1956).
96 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960). Cf. Gordon v. Clairol Incorporated, 22
Conn. Super. 209, 166 A.2d 209 (1960).
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upon exposure to it, there is a bodily reaction which results in one
or another of the allergic disturbances. It is common knowledge
that eggs, strawberries, fish, and other products in common use, as
well as the pollen of certain flowering plants or shrubs, will produce
allergic reactions in some people. The sale of an article or product
in its natural state may cause an allergic reaction, but the seller
should not be held liable under the law of implied warranty unless
there is some inherent defect in the product sold. A warranty of
reasonable fitness must be construed in the light of common
knowledge with reference to the nature of the article or product
sold. Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 457, 107 A.2d 277.
A warranty of this kind does not mean that the goods can be used
with absolute safety or that they are perfectly adapted to the in-
tended use, but only that they shall be reasonably fit therefor.
Cavanaugh v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 308 Mass. 423, 426, 32
N.E.2d 256.97
In spite of this pronouncement the court concluded, without a
scintilla of evidence, that the manufacturer's recommended patch
or skin test for hypersensitivity to be made prior to the application
of the depilatory "is not always efficacious," and "there were facts
from which the jury could have found that "Nudit" contained an in-
gredient which had a tendency to produce an injurious reaction in
persons allergic to it, that the plaintiff was one of an appreciable
number of persons who could be injuriously affected by its use, and
that her injuries were caused by a breach of implied warranty.""8
The complete turnabout of the court is incredible, especially since
the lower trial court had directed a verdict for the defendant.
THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES LABELING ACT
On July 12, 1960, by approval of President Eisenhower, the Fed-
eral Hazardous Substances Labeling Act became law, effective Febru-
ary 1, 1961. 9 This statute imposes criminal penalties for failure to warn
97 Id. at 466, 162 A.2d at 516. The facts showed: "The plaintiff asked the sales
girl at the cosmetic counter in the defendant's store for a good hair remover, without
specifying any brand. The clerk sold her a hair remover called Nudit, a preparation
contained in a tube which was packed, together with a tube of finishing cream, in a
cardboard box. Under the directions on the box and on the tube of Nudit, the user
whose skin was supersensitive was, on the first occasion, to make a test in accord-
ance with instructions in a booklet enclosed in the box." Id. at 461-462, 162 A.2d
at 514.
98 Id. at 468, 162 A.2d at 517.
99 The effective date of the enforcement provision was extended to Aug. 1, 1961
(and then to Feb. 1, 1962) except for products which are highly toxic, extremely
flammable, and flammable. Extensions of time have also been given for other provisions
of the statute.
Penalties include fines up to $500 imprisonment up to 90 days, or where there is
intent to defraud and mislead $3,000 and 1 year respectively. The law also provides for
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of the hazards of certain household chemical products in the use or
storage about the home. If the product is "hazardous," i.e., it is toxic,
corrosive, contains an irritant or a strong sensitizer, is flammable, radio-
active (if named by regulation), or is packaged in a pressure container,
the container must bear a warning label, identifying the hazard and
the hazardous ingredients, and also giving advice on precautionary and
first aid measures.
Under Section 2 (f) "hazardous substance" is defined, among other
definitions, as a substance or mixture of substances which is a "strong
sensitizer," provided that it may cause "substantial injury or illness
during or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably fore-
seeable handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion by
children." The standard for determining what is a "strong sensitizer 1 °0
is in theory, at least, that standard which is generally recognized at
common law in civil liability cases relating to the seller's duty to warn
users of the hazards of his products.1°1 But, in practical logic, by virtue
of FDA's own definition of a "strong allergic sensitizer," the product
manufacturer or seller becomes an insurer of his product against every
eventuality, including an allergic response in a susceptible individual
user, provided that a "substantial number"'0 2 of individuals experience
the "allergenic sensitization." Indeed, the strict liability doctrine again
rears its ugly head,103 although the product is not defective nor un-
reasonably dangerous to persons other than the allergic few.
The Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare under Regulation
Section 191.6 has already determined and designated certain sub-
injunctions. It is similar to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in its provisions for
factory inspection, sample collection, publicity, and coverage of imports.
100 Under Regulation 191.1(i) a "strong allergic sensitizer" is defined as "a sub-
stance that produces an allergenic sensitization in a substantial number of persons who
come into contact with it." This FDA Regulation continues: "An allergic reaction
ordinarily does not develop on first contact because of necessity of prior exposure to the
substance in question. The sensitized tissue exhibits a greatly increased capacity to react
to subsequent exposures of the offending agent. Thus, subsequent exposures may produce
severe reactions with little correlation to the amounts of the excitant involved."
101 A manufacturer or vendor is ordinarily liable for latent defects, if there is
reason to believe that he should have discovered the defect. See Thomas v. Jerominik,
170 N.Y.S.2d 388, 8 Misc. 2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
102 According to Food Chemical News of August 7, 1961, the FDA advisory
panel of six dermatologists endorsed FDA's definition of "strong sensitizer" and com-
mented that "a strong sensitizer" causes sensitization in one or more persons in 10,000
population, or less, if the sensitization is severe. It is incredible that the FDA could
designate a "strong sensitizer" under these terms without conducting tests on 10,000
individuals, which testing the FDA cannot afford in time or in money.
103 See generally Dickerson, "Recent Developments in Food Products Liability,"
8 Prac. Law. 17-36 (April 1962).
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stances" 4 as "strong sensitizers" meriting "Warning" or "Caution"
labeling. One of these substances is oil of bergamot which is rarely if
ever sold as a household item. ° 5 The Essential Oil Association, after
surveying its membership about its use and experience with oil of
bergamot, reported that with an industry use of 75,000 lbs. annually,
there was no adverse experience:
Fortunately there are some good articles published such as the
one by Dr. Ed Masters in the New York State Medical journal.
This paper showed a summary of a major cosmetic company's ex-
perience on complaints. It represented 113 plus million units sold
in 18 different cosmetic categories. The average number of reactions
were 0.4 per 100,000 units. In the case of colognes and perfumes
which would be expected to have the highest percentage of perfume
oil, the reactions were .02 per 100,000 units. Certainly this would
seem to be far less than one reaction in 10,000 individuals, since this
represented sales over a number of years. 10 6
Another substance designated by the Secertary is paraphenylene-
diamine or PPD, the coal tar derivative upon the oxidation of which
the coloring action of permanent hair tint depends. This listing of PPD
as a strong sensitizer (the incidence of hair dye sensitivity is perhaps
one out of 150,000 persons) 10 7 must be construed with reference to
the so-called exemption under Sec. 2(f)(2) of the Act for foods,
drugs, and cosmetics which are under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. A hair tint which is not adulterated under Sec. 601 of
the FFD&C Act, nor misbranded under Sec. 602 of the FFD&C Act,
may become misbranded under the FFD&C Act, if that hair tint "offers
a substantial risk of injury or illness from any handling or use that is
customary or usual." And the reason behind the FDA threat is that
the hair tint's "label fails to reveal material facts with respect to con-
sequences that may result from the use of the article when its label
fails to bear information to alert the householder to this hazard."0 s
104 "(a) Paraphenylenediamine and products containing it. (b) Powered orris
root and products containing it. (c) Epoxy resins systems containing in any con-
centration ethylenediamine, diethylenetriamine, and diglycidyl ethers or molecular
weight of less than 200. (d) Formaldehyde and products containing 1 percent or more
of formaldehyde. (e) Oil of bergamot and products containing 2 percent or more
of oil of bergamot."
105 "It is inconceivable that any household product might contain 2% or more
of bergamot." American Perfumer (October 1961), p. 32.
106 Id. at page 33.
107 See Reiss, Gahweiler & Lustig, "Sensitivity to Hair Dyes," J. of Allergy
28:134-141 (1957). Also, Reiss, "Contact Dermatitis: A Survey of its Incidence." 116
Dermatologica 419-425 (1958).
108 Note Paragraph 191.61 of Regulations published in Federal Register of August
12, 1961: "Exemptions for food, drugs, cosmetics. (a) Food, drugs, and cosmetics.
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Such a hair tint presently carries a caution statement'09 on its label
and is therefore not adulterated. But the FDA, working surreptitiously
and without industry consultation, has drafted proposals for amend-
ments, including a new Sec. 605 and the removal of the coal tar
hair dye exemption under Sec. 601 (a) of the FFD&C Act. As a result,
the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act has been subverted
from a statute limited to "household chemical" products which cannot
be sold unpackaged and which from their nature must be in a con-
tainer in order to be handled or used,110 to a statute embracing within
its bureaucratic arms the vast cosmetic and beauty industry of the
United States.
Interestingly, the Act, while requiring precautionary labeling, does
not provide that a known hazard be the subject of a warning. There
is no duty to remind the consumer of something he or she should or
already knows: "When a dangerous condition is fully obvious and gen-
Substances subject to the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act are exempted by section
2(f)(2) of the act; but where a food, drug or cosmetic offers a substantial risk of
injury or illness from any handling or use that is customary or usual it may be
regarded as misbranded under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act because its
label fails to reveal material facts with respect to consequences that may result from
use of the article (21 U.S.C. 321(n)) when its label fails to bear information to alert
the householder to this hazard." (Italics added.)
109 Supra note 84.
110 Commissioner George P. Larrick in a statement before the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1283 illustrated those household
products which should be regulated under the new Act: "A number of dry cleaning
preparations for rugs, upholstery, and other fabrics contain volatile materials that
are toxic not only by ingestion but also by inhalation. One of these ingredients, carbon
tetrachloride, has been widely used as a spot and stain remover in the home and as
an ingredient in home fire extinguishers. Although industry for years has been well
aware of the toxic nature of carbon tetrachloride and has devised safeguards to protect
workers who must use it, this knowledge has not extended to the home. Household users
have suffered serious damage to their liver and kidneys, and fatal injuries from in-
baling fumes of carbon tetrachloride while cleaning rugs and other household items.
Detergents for cleaning, washing, and water softening frequently contain highly alka-
line chemicals capable of causing serious burns. Metal cleaners and polishes and
rust removers have been on the market with such toxic ingredients as cyanide, hydro-
fluoric add, fluosilicic acld and methylene chloride. Each of these chemicals has caused
injury to home users. The cyanides in particular have caused a number of deaths
over the years. Furniture polishes may contain ingredients, including kerosene oil,
which are extremely toxic if swallowed. Being attractively scented and colored, they
are often swallowed by children when left within reach and have been responsible
for many deaths. Household bleaches contain chlorine compounds that are quite toxic
when swallowed. Injuries to children from these bleaches are a common experience
in most of the poison control centers throughout the country. Paints, paint removers,
brush cleaners, and accessory products have caused injuries in the home over a period
of years. These are just a few examples of the types of household products whose
labeling is not now regulated under the Federal law. These materials require better
regulation to safeguard those in the home."
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erally appreciated, nothing of value is added by a warning.""' Indeed,
since there is no product under the sun to which some person at some
time is not sensitive, it is arguable that a precautionary warning of a
possible allergic response is not at all necessary. But a warning of a
possible allergic response can be meaningful and will be observed by
the consumer, if such warnings are restricted to those products con-
taining only the strongest sensitizers.1 2 Otherwise, an unnecessary
warning of the alleged hazard weakens the impact of necessary warn-
ings of unknown hazards."'
SOME PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Procedurally, two paramount problems center about disclosure
of prior complaints, and disclosure of product formula. These pro-
cedural weapons in the hands of plaintiff have frequently coerced
product manufacturers into settlement of doubtful claims. Yet legal
research should have convinced the manufacturer that data on prior
complaints and on product formulae are beyond the reach of the al-
lergic plaintiff, unless and until a proper foundation has been laid.
In 1959 a federal court in Illinois,"" upheld the manufacturer's
objections to certain interrogatories calling for disclosure of the num-
ber, names and addresses of complainants because the question was
vague and too broad. The same court refused to give the allergic con-
sumer the name of the ingredients that may cause skin irritations be-
cause the question assumed that the product did contain harmful in-
gredients, which was not proved.
The New York Supreme Court has stated the exclusionary rule:
Evidence of prior accidents is admissible if the conditions under
which the prior accidents occured were the same. . . Where the
111 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, (1956), p. 1542 and p. 1546. Par. 28.5
and Par. 28.7.
112 "The term 'strong sensitizer' means a substance which will cause on normal
living tissue through an allergic or photodynamic process a hypersensitivity which
becomes evident on reapplication of the same substance and which is designated as such
by the Secretary. Before designating any substance as a strong sensitizer, the Secretary,
upon consideration of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the reaction, shall
find that the substance has a significant potential for causing hypersensitivity." Sec.
2(K), 15 U.S.C. § 1261(k).
13 See Section 2(p) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 126 1(p), as to the pattern of
precautionary labeling, i.e., the appropriate signal word. "Danger," "Warning," or
"Caution"; affirmative statement of the hazard; statement of the precautionary
measures to be followed or avoided; instructions for handling and storage of
packages requiring special care in handling or storage; the statement "Keep Out
of reach of Children" or its practical equivalent; and label bearing name and address
of manufacturer, packer, producer, or seller.
314 Burns v. Clairol Incorporated, D.C.N.D. Ill. decided Nov. 25, (1959).
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conditions are not similar, such evidence is inadmissible. The
questions here concern accidents occuring under conditions and at
places completely dissimilar and are therefore irrelevant." 5
Similar conditions in a claim for allergic injuries must take into account
these minimal facets: (a) precisely the same product; (b) use of prod-
uct in strict accord with the instructions accompanying the product;
(c) age and sex of complainant; (d) prior exposure to sensitizing
substances; (e) manner of use or application of the product; and
(f) reasonable period of time involved.
In the event that a court in its discretion admits evidence of prior,
similar accidents, the admissibility is limited to the showing of notice
to the product manufacturer of the danger of the product.116 As the
New York Appellate Division opined: "The mere happening of an
accident is not in and of itself proof of negligence nor proof of freedom
from contributory negligence.""1
7
Disclosure of formulae or trade secrets is another weapon in the
arsenal of the allergic consumer to harass the product manufacturer
into a favorable settlement. But the courts have generally stood firm in
protecting this property right of the manufacturer,"" and have erected
these four protective barriers: (1) proof of materiality or relevancy
of the requested composition information to the plaintiff's allegations
of injury;" 9 (2) proof of absolute necessity or indispensability of ob-
taining such information to allow plaintiff to make out his cause of
action and proceed with his burden of proof; 2 ° (3) proof that the
product is "poisonous," "inherently deleterious," or "defective"' 21 ;
115 York v. Shaer (N.Y.L.J. Sept. 10, 1959).
116 See Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
"17 Kaplan v. City of New York, 6 App. Div. 489, 179 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1960).
118 Taylor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 34 (1889); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins
Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477 (D.W.D. Mo. 1950).
119 See Wagner Mfg. Co. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 480 (S.D. Ohio 1950);
Hollywood Shoe Polish Co. v. Knowmark Mfg. Co., 20 Misc. 2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
120 See Melori Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens Inc., 14 F.R.D. 346 (D. Mass. 1953).
Cf. Bleacher v. Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. Del. 1960) and Fibron
Products, Inc. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 206 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
121 In Procter & Gamble Dist. Co. v. Vasseur, 275 S.W.2d 941 (1955), the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky declined to compel the manufacturer to disclose the exact
proportions or percentages of the ingredients of the product, holding same to be trade
secrets, unless and until "it shall be shown by the evidence that the use of a large
proportion of any one of the ingredients used in the ingredients used in the manufacture
of the soap powder 'Cheer' would have an injurious effect upon the skin of its users."
Obviously, a product is not "defective" even if it is a dangerous article, provided that
it was properly made. "Defective" means simply "improperly made."
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and (4) proof that the requested composition information is not ob-
tainable in any other manner.
122
Probably the leading case against disclosure of product composi-
tion data is Drake v. Hermann,128 decided by the New York Court
of Appeals almost thirty years ago. Judge Lehman found that the
plaintiff had failed to show that the data requested as to composition
was not otherwise available, and refused to allow any disclosure of
the information whatsoever. In 1948 the New York Appellate Division,
First Department, specifically cited the Drake case as still controlling,
and refused to reveal defendant's trade secrets upon pretrial examina-
tion of the defendant. 4 In Gehm v. Countess Maritza Cosmetic Co.1
25
plaintiff moved to examine defendant before trial as to the "component"
parts of a deodorant. The New York Supreme Court denied the motion
by referring to "the secrecy of property rights (which) may be en-
dangered." In 1951 in Levy v. Roux Distributing Co.1 26 the New York
Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously declared:
No appellant shall be required in making such statement or on
such examination, to disclose any formula or manufacturing proc-
ess used in the production of its products. 127
Numerous federal court opinions also support the holding in Drake
v. Hermann. In Lenerts v. Rapidol Distributing Co. 125 the federal
district court, despite the admittedly liberality of Federal Rules 30(a)
and 30(b) on discovery and inspection, held: "It is improper to re-
quire the defendant to reveal a secret formula or trade secret in a case
of this nature." In Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.129 the federal
district court found only the ingredients of the sun-tan oil to be relevant
to the factual issues of the case, and in strong language unconditionally
refused to allow disclosure of "proportions" of such ingredients.
The New York Appellate Division in Hyman v. Roux Distributing
122 In Drake v. Hermann, 261 N.Y. 414, 185 N.E. 685 (1933) the highest New
York court declared: "If analysis will divulge all the ingredients but not the process
of manufacture, plaintiff cannot be said to have a right based upon necessity to
examine the defendant respecting the presence of these ingredients."
123 Supra note 122.
124 See Kaplan v. Roux Distr. Co., 273 App. Div. 865, 76 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1948):
"The plaintiff has made no showing of necessity for an examination that may reveal trade
secrets, nor that the information cannot be obtained otherwise."
125 196 Misc. 785, 95 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
126 279 App. Div. 611, 107 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1951).
127 Note that in Levy v. Roux Dist. Co., supra note 126, the Appellate Division
modified the order of the trial court as to disclosure of ingredients by permitting
defendants to submit a written statement as to ingredients and samples of the product.
128 3 F.R.D. 42 (D.N.D.N.Y. 1942).
129 10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
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Co.13° took occasion to describe at length the meaning of its order. It
limits the "examination to 'ingredients' of the product and does not
include a requirement that appellant disclose its formula. Such formula
is a property right which should not be disclosed save in case of urgent
necessity. There is no reason for such disclosure."
In the Vasseur case 3 ' the highest Kentucky court upheld the
manufacturer's refusal, in good faith, not to name the exact proportion
of ingredients in the soap product which allegedly caused injuries to
the arms and legs of the user. To require disclosure in such instances
would result in needlessly giving away of valuable trade secrets which
should be safeguarded. The court also refused to allow the plaintiff to
conduct a "fishing expedition" with respect to prior complaints received
by the defendant.
If plaintiff contends that the ingredients or substances in the
product were toxic, the mere demand for disclosure of ingredients will
not be honored, unless there is competent proof of toxicity of those
substances, for such proof of toxicity is an indispensable prerequisite
to a direction that defendant disclose whether they are present in its
preparation.
CONCLUSIONS
The growing but unwarranted concept of "liability without fault"
in the field of products liability has prompted the manufacturer of
the product (and all managers of consumer product businesses) to
reach out and meet the problem with understandable responsibility.
It can readily be shown that today the average manufacturer has
adopted higher standards of care in the manufacture and distribution
of his product. He has sensibly endeavored to maintain higher stand-
ards of truth in advertising his product, and to minimize any possible
misleading representations about the efficacy of the product. Such
enlightened business manufacturers have adopted liberal modi oper-
andi to satisfy the complaining consumer-cash refunds, product ex-
changes, and even admission of liability for nuisance value purposes.
The increase in the number of products liability insurance policies
in force reflects concern for the welfare of the consumer market.
From the purely medical point of view, the dermatologist has
great difficulty in understanding why courts assess liability against
a manufacturer, distributor, or vendor of a product to which a given
plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible. Dr. Frederick Reiss in an address
before the Society of Medical Jurisprudence, New York Academy of
130 100 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1950).
131 Procter & Gamble Dist. Co. v. Vasseur, supra note 121.
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Medicine, in February 1959, expressed his personal incredulity in
these words:
Certain individuals are far more responsible for an allergic reaction
than is the causative agent. Who is responsible for the hives that
may follow the eating of a bowl of strawberries? Is it the grocer
who sold the strawberries? The farmer who grew them? If the
lobster eaten at a good restaurant causes a reaction, does the fault lie
with the restaurant, the lobster fisherman or even with the U.S.
Government from whose waters the lobsters were taken?
It is my view that if the responsibility is to be placed, then the
greatest fault is that of the parents whose chromosome pattern
caused the predispostion of an individual's allergy traits. The fault
cannot lie with the manufacturer or distributor. Moreover, since
the dermatitis following an allergic response is usually self-limiting
-naturally when the use of such a cosmetic is eliminated--claims
for injury are, it seems to me, not in proportion to the proper re-
sponsibility of the manufacturer.
After reviewing important dermatological aspects of allergic reactions,
including the existence of cross-sensitization, Dr. Reiss concluded by
asserting that what is required is:
* * . a recasting of the attitudes of lawyers and the courts. The
responsibility of the manufacturer for the quality of his product is
a continuing factor, but must he be held responsible for the altered
from the normal, differing reaction of the user? Allergic responses
are of course due to the sensitizing nature of substances themselves,
but also to individualistic responses by the complex human being.18 2
The problem facing bench and bar today in the field of allergic
responses is insoluble, unless the potential liability is reasonably
limited. An equilibrium must be found which will encourage caution
but will not impose unrealistic burdens upon the manufacturer, dis-
tributor, and retailer. Liability, whether in tort or in contract, must
first be tested as a matter of law by the court. If there is no possible
liability in law (for the defendant has violated no legal obligation),
the matter should be summarily dismissed. "Liability without fault"
is not a doctrine which the American economy can or will accept,
especially where facts and circumstances dictate otherwise. The al-
lergic response is, at most, a temporary discomfort sustained by a
hypersensitive individual using a product which is ordinarily harmless
to the average person. Where the consumer product has precautionary
labeling, the failure of the complainant follow such "commonly used
precautions prevailing among the general public"'83 should bar relief.
132 Drug and Cosmetic Industry, April, 1959, p. 435.
133 Indeed, a majority of jurisdictions hold that if the article sold can be used
by a normal person without injury, there is no breach of the implied warranty of
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For the courts to hold otherwise would surely lead to economic chaos in
all fields of industry.'34 Every farmer, every fisherman, every fruit
grower, even the Almighty who produces humanity, dust, cold or
the warm air, and other natural phenomena, could be held liable for
reactions of those few hypersensitive individuals. Surely the law must
be sensible, realistic and worthy of respect in logic and experience.
reasonable fitness, Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922); Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Barrett v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941); Stanton v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal.
App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939); Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893
(10th Cir. 1956); and Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404
(1946). In these cases the injured party was described as one who suffered from
a peculiar or unique susceptibility to harm from the article or product sold; or, he was
found to have a peculiar sensitivity or unusual bodily condition unknown to the seller.
134 Perhaps the so-called Tennessee rule, as applied in Spencer v. Cutter Labora-
tories, US.D.C., N.D. Calif., Aug. 15, 1956, should be given universal application.
Here U.S. District Court Judge Murphy dismissed the counts charging breach of war-
ranty against the defendant manufacturer who sold the vaccine in California and
shipped it to Tennessee where it was sold by a Tennessee distribution to a Tennessee
doctor who injected it into plaintiff causing the alleged injuries. Judge Murphy applied
the Tennessee rule that actions for causing injury by manufacturing or distributing
noxious substances for human consumption must be based upon negligence alone, and
may not be brought under a warranty theory or any other theory of liability
without fault.
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